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Modern day politics is a global affair with politicians now having an unparalleled opportunity to
communicate manifesto points via a range of media (see e.g., Grabe and Bucy, 2009). Most, if
not all, significant election campaigns now feature a press officer who directs such broadcasts and
regular media training is de rigueur for anybody with political aspirations. Such ubiquitous and
uniform treatment of the broadcast message ensures that successful politicians need to develop
a unique performance style to stand out from the crowd. Here, we consider the effects that a
politician’s unique media presence can have on the outcome of an election, specifically the 2019
UK General Election. As will be shown the role of non-verbal (or paralinguistic) communication is
key to understanding the efficacy of such a political style.
This election was unique as its outcome gave the winner the legislative authority to enact the
UKs eventual withdrawal from Europe and conclude Britain’s exit from the European Union (i.e.,
“Brexit”). The outcome of the 2019 election resulted in a massive gain in power for the eventual
winner, Boris Johnson, and the resignation of Jeremy Corbyn’s position as leader of the main
opposition party, Labour; as well as the complete loss of any parliamentary standing for Joanna
Swinson, the leader of the second main opposition party, the Liberal Democrats.
There is no doubt that Brexit featured heavily in the election campaigns of each of the three
major political parties at this election. Yet, some argue that the outcome of this election was driven
less by a successful “pro-leave” movement that secured the departure and more by a more general
national dissatisfaction, in which voters were angry with the drawn-out constitutional processes of
the UK government and wanted the Brexit process simply to end (Curtice, 2016; Flinders, 2020a).
Indeed, the 2019 election was called to ostensibly solve the constitutional paralysis that emerged in
attempting to enact the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum.
The outcome of the 2019 election was especially unusual given the fact that at the time public
perception of politicians in general was at an historical low (IPSOS MORI, 2020). With the
three main political leaders each enjoying less favourable polling than each of their respective
counterparts in the previous general elections held 2017 and 20151—it is was clear that politics
as usual was not a useful guide.
The national sentiment toward politics in general was also at a historic low at the eve
of this election. An audit on political engagement carried out by the Hansard Society in
2019 revealed that nearly half of the sample tested indicated that they felt that they had
no influence whatsoever in national decision making with a staggering 75% indicating that
they felt that the democratic system in the UK needed to be changed. It was also noted
that “Opinions of the system of governing are at their worst point in 15 years. . . people are
pessimistic about the country’s problems and their possible solution, with sizable numbers
willing to entertain radical political changes” (The Hansard Society, 2019, p. 3). A majority of
the population indicated that they were currently experiencing “Brexit fatigue” and merely
wanted it to go away. Such “Brexistential Angst” (Flinders, 2020b, p. 226) coupled with
1Indeed, such was the degree of dissatisfaction that Johnson, who scored minus 20% in public satisfaction ratings, was still 2%
more popular than Swinson and 24% more popular than Corbyn (see Curtice, 2020).
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significant disillusionment in politics provided a perfect
opportunity for the successful emergence of a distinctive leader
who could develop and deploy a unique performance style to
shift the negative attitudes that were universally experienced in
the UK, and effect a successful outcome in the election (see also
Hay, 2020).
Immediately prior to the 2019 election one could be mistaken
for assuming that there was only one political leader in the
UK, Boris Johnson, such was his presence in the national media
(Yates, 2019 and see also Tolson, 2018). Notwithstanding his
own personal levels of popularity (or otherwise), Johnson took
advantage of the growing disdain for politics in general and
started to develop a unique persona that was replete with symbols
that clearly positioned certain politicians (including himself)
as unconventional and radical leaders e.g., using the media to
generate an “us vs. them” narrative (see e.g., Barr, 2009). This
allowed him to generate controversary and apply it to saturate
the broadcast media which in turn served to divert debate (e.g.,
Moffitt, 2016).
From such a perspective, he was effectively demonstrating
that he was the radical politician who would get things done
despite the complexity of parliamentary rules2. Such a view
is almost diametrically opposed to the common view among
political commentators of Johnson as at best something of a
bumbler, lurching from one gaffe to another (e.g., Murphy, 2017),
or at worst a genuinely bad person (see e.g., Murphy, 2019). The
effective communication of such a political position goes beyond
linguistic channels and is firmly embedded within the domain of
paralinguistic or non-verbal communication.
Corbyn’s campaign, on the other hand, was defined by a
less aggressive form of communication. Early on the electoral
campaign he declared that he would remain neutral in the
unlikely event of a second referendum. However, in doing so he
also implicitly declared that he was a leader who would continue
to abide by the rules that were perceived to have immobilised
constitutional debate in the UK, and in turn had led to significant
levels of national disillusionment. Further, despite Swinson’s
Liberal Democrats positioning themselves as the only clearly pro-
remain party, she failed to capitalise on the political situation
and did not present a viable opposition to Johnson’s ubiquitous
pro-leave message (Sloman, 2020).
For Johnson such a strategy was very effective as the voting
demographic of Brexit was clearly polarised. Working class
older voters with few university qualifications voted mostly
to leave the EU while middle class and younger university
graduates voted to remain (Curtice, 2020). Thus, both Johnson
and Corbyn were campaigning to promote policy that was not
directly aligned with their traditional electoral bases. However,
Corbyn’s neutrality merely served to drive dissatisfaction from
those who wish to remain in the EU who, without a viable
option to Remain, were left to split their vote or support
2It could be argued that Johnson’s proroguing of parliament (an act that was
subsequently deemed unlawful by the UK Supreme Court), his refusal to apologise
for apparently racist and homophobic behaviour, and his insouciance when faced
with the significant criticism for his delay in releasing a report from the Intelligence
and Security committee into Russian Interference in the 2016 Referendum, were
all examples of astute statecraft that fed directly into the polarisation of the
national consensus.
Johnson, who also had the advantage of using Brexit to channel
disaffected citizens to vote for him (and indeed a significant
number of traditional Labour voters did support him in the ballot
box; Curtice, 2020).
Thus, Johnson’s approach was clear: use distinct non-verbal
behaviour to dominate the media and focus the dissatisfied
population with a strong pro-leave message to make inroads
into the tradition labour heartlands. As long as Brexit was
the key and ubiquitous message in any 2019 general election
campaign narrative, there would be no need to promote a policy
to target pro-remain voters. Here the threat of Brexit continuing
was merely the means by which the Conservatives gained a
considerable increase in power in an election that was promoted
to a population that was significantly dissatisfied with elections
(Macdougall et al., 2020).
Johnson’s unique form of communication allowed him to
dominate the news narrative while also enabling a focused
application of territorial targeting of traditional Labour-held
areas outside of Labour’s London heartland (Cooper and Cooper,
2020; Cutts et al., 2020). Coupled with the effective application
of “Brexit fatigue,” this ensured Johnson could develop a unique
media style that also allowed him to separate the Conservative
party message from other pro-leave political parties that may
have had more of a right-wing narrative (Goodman, 2020). As
a unique communication strategy, this was so effective it resulted
in what was tantamount to the complete annihilation of political
opposition and the domination of the Conservative party in the
UK political arena (Cutts et al., 2020).
Indeed, results from the May 2021 local government and
Hartlepool by-elections strongly support this narrative, with
Conservative support strengthening. This is unprecedented for a
government which has been in power now for well over a decade.
However, the presence of a large Boris Johnson-shaped blimp
over Hartlepool to celebrate his victory does somewhat suggest
that normal rules no longer apply. While copious ink has been
spilt on commentary regarding the changing electorate, and the
failings of Johnson’s opponents, the scientific question is perhaps
more interesting than the political one; specifically, what (if any)
mechanisms did Johnson employ to ensure his form of populism
was so effective?
It is clear that under Johnson’s superficially clownish
behaviour there existed a very serious statesman who was able to
communicate non-verbally with great precision. Somemay credit
this to luck rather than judgement, of course, although we suggest
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the repeated
success of Johnson suggests at least some conscious behavioural
and strategic method behind what may appear madness. Indeed,
in support of this reading, previous accounts of his unique
political style have been termed “Borisonian Populism” (Flinders,
2020a).
We suggest here that Johnson’s adroit use of non-verbal
channels should also be included under this term. Such non-
verbal channels traditionally refer to how behaviours such as
facial displays, eye gaze, shifts in posture, body language, and
even vocalic utterances etc. are communicated (Giri, 2009).
Johnson’s dominance of the media, fuelled by his near-constant
willingness to court controversy (which are two main elements
of his populist performative strategy), would obviously be
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augmented by an effective repertoire of non-verbal displays. It is
clear that Johnson’s unique performative style strongly reinforced
his verbal message and led to his current domination of the
political arena (Cutts et al., 2020)3. Future work in this area
should consider the central role that non-verbal behaviours play
in the effective communication of a particular political strategy
(see e.g., Tur et al., 2021).
However, despite the success of Johnson’s performance
style on the outcomes of the 2019 general election there
are a number of questions that still remain to be answered.
First, while there is no doubt that Johnson’s non-verbal
style of communication was indeed highly effective,
the question is to what extent is this style directly and
3See also Banić (2020) and Müller (2020) for a wider debate as to efficacy of
Johnson’s non-verbal displays.
consciously transferable to other politicians? In other words, is
this a fortunate conflation of natural style with a highly receptive
audience? Or is it something more? Similarly, it also remains to
be seen whether or not the effect is context specific or is generally
effective in other “non-Brexit” related scenarios. Finally, perhaps
the most important question is to what extent does a unique
non-verbal communication style effect the electorate?More work
is needed before the important role of non-verbal channels in
driving political outcome with a populist performative style is
fully understood.
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